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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ETHEL LOUISE GREGERSON,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.Case No. 7674
EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, is appellant's.)
Plaintiff sued, as beneficiary, to recover on a certificate of insurance issued on the life of Dr. Grant
Gregerson by the Mountain States Insurance Company, a
mutual benefit association, which policy was assumed by
the defendant on September 1, 1949 (R. 9, 45).
Defendant denied liability on the ground that plaintiff failed to submit to a physical examination and
furnish proper proof of insurability to reinstate the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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policy, after its lapse due to the failure to pay the premiums within the grace period (R. 3, 4 and Exhibits 1, 2,
3 and 4). A further ground for refusal to admit liability
was that certain statements made by the insured in his
application for the policy sued upon, constituted warranties, and being false, rendered the policy void (Exhibit "A", R. 4, 5).
The Mountain States Insurance Company, pursuant
to application for membership made by Dr. Gregerson,
a dentist, issued the policy sued upon on June 1, 1947 (R.
12). Prior thereto, the insured had been insured under
another policy issued by the Mountain States Insurance
Company, which was in force for a period of some years
(R. 12).
It was stipulated between counsel for the parties
that Gregerson paid the premiums on the policy sued
upon to January 1, 1950, that a premium was due on
January 1, 1950, but that no premium was received by
defendant on said date or within the grace period of
thirty days thereafter (R. 9). On February 2, 1950, a
payment of the monthly premium due January 1, 1950,
was tendered to defendant to reinstate the policy, but the
same was refused and held in suspense pending receipt
of the application for reinstatement and evidence of
insurability (R. 9, 23, 24, 25 and Exhibit 3).
On February 9, 1950, the defendants advised insured that it could not reinstate the lapsed policy unless
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the insured co1npleted and returned the application for
reinstatement and state1nent of health to its office (Exhibit 1).
Thereafter, the plaintiff, ~Irs. Gregerson, returned
the uncon1pleted application for reinstatement to defendant's office, advising defendant's clerk that Dr. Gregerson, the insured, \Yas ill and could not sign the statement
of health (R. 19, 20, -±5). Plaintiff then obtained a. letter
from Dr. L. H. 0. Stobbe, insured's physician, and presented it to defendant's office (Exhibit 2, R. 21). Dr.
Stobbe's report in effect stated that insured had been
completely incapacitated from hypertension for a whole
year (Exhibit 2).
On the basis of Dr. Stobbe's report it was determined
by defendant that insured would have to furnish satisfactory evidence of insurability before the policy could
be reinstated, and upon his failure so to do, the tendered
prennums were returned and refunded (Exhibits 3, 4,
R. 24-28).
·No further tender of premium payments was made
unt~ May 3, 1950, almost a month after the death of
insured, when a tender of $47.07, covering monthly premiums due February 1, 1950, March 1, 1950, and April 1,
1950, was received in defendant's office (R. 10, 31, 32).
The insured died on April 8, 1950 (R. 10), at which
time the policy sued upon had lapsed, and the same cancelled when no application for reinstatement or evidence
of insurability was forthcoming (Exhibits 1, 3, 4, R. 10).
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The policy contained the usual provisions for payment of premiums, and that if said premiums were not
paid within the grace period allowed, that evidence of
insurability satisfactory to the insurer must be furnished
(Exhibit "A", page 2). The policy further provided that
the application became part of the contract itself; that
all statements by insured in the application are to be
considered warranties and not representations, and that
if any of such warranties are proven untrue that the
policy would be void and the insurer relieved of all
liability thereunder (Exhibit "A", pages 2_ and 3). These
provisions, as well as other pertinent clauses of the
policy, will be more fully set out in appellant's argument.
A written application was made on May 23, 1947, to
the Mountain States Insurance Company, a mutual benefit association, by insured, Grant Gregerson, which
application contained certain statements of warranty
relative to the state of health of the applicant (Exhibit
"A"). The Court, in its finding No.6, (R. 46) found that
this application set out in the defendant's answer was a
part of Exhibit "A", and that the insured had been
hospitalized at the L. D. S. Hospital from April 27 to
May 11, 1946, with medical reports thereon as detailed
in defendant's Exhibits 6 and 7 (R. 46).
The

appl~cation

(Exhibit "A") contained the follow-

ing statements and provisions, among others, which
applicant answered as follows:
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"9. (a) HaYe you ever had any of the following
diseases~ Ansvver each. Tuberculosis or
any respiratory disease No. Any disease
of the brain or nervous system ______ . Any
heart or circulatory disease No. Diabetes
No. Kidney Disease No. If so, give details ________________________________________________________________ .
(b) Have you had any local or constitutional
disease within the past 5 years~ No.
(c) Has any medical examiner or physician,
formally or informally expressed unfavorable opinion as to your insurability
or health~ No.
(d) Have you ever had, or been advised to
have any surgical operation~ No.
(e) Have you ever been under observation,
care or treatment in any hospital, sanitarium, asylum or similar institution~ No.
(f) Are you now in good health~ Yes.
"10. Name below all causes for which you have
consulted a physician in the last ten years.
No. of
Illness
Attacks

Attending
Severity
Any
Physi&
Remaining cian's
Duration Effects Name and
Address

Date

None

*

* *

"12. I hereby apply to the Mountain States Insurance Company for Membership and a Policy
of Insurance and do hereby, represent and warrant that all the statements, representations and
answers in this application are full, complete and
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true, whether written in my own hand or not; and
that this application shall be the basis and become
part of the Contract between myself and the Company; and that any concealments, misrepresentations or untrue statements herein or if I am not
alive and in good health at the time of the acceptance and delivery of the policy based hereon, or
at the time of any reinstatement after a lapse
thereof, hereby forfeit any benefits under any
Policy that may be issued and hereby authorize
the Secretary or President to cancel this Policy.

*

*

*

"Dated at Salt Lake This 23 day of May, 1947.
-------------------------------------------- ( s) Dr. Grant Gregerson
General Agent
Signature of Applicant
(s) Henry J. Black
Soliciting Agent

If Applicant be a minor,
written guarantee of parents or guardian must be
secured."

A summary of the hospital record prepared by Dr.
Stobbe, (Exhibit 6), while insured was hospitalized at
the L. D. S. Hospital from April 27, 1946, to May 11,
1946, shows a final diagnosis of cardiac failure, probably
coronary; hypertension, cardiac asthma, and treatment
consisting of digitalis (R. 39, 40). Exhibit 7 is a hospital
record covering about fifteen days' treatment of insured
in the V. A. Hospital at Salt Lake City, starting on
October 13, 1947. Dr. R. M. Dalrymple, M. D., made a
final diagnosis at that time of disease of the heart, inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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eluding hypertensiYe rardio-Ya8enlnr disease; left ventricle hypertrophy; and acute left ventricular failure with
delayed conduction (Exhibit 7).
The action "\vas tried before the Court, without a
jur~~, on February S, 1931, and on February 15th, judgment "\Yas entered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant for the sun1 of $3,000.00, the face an1ount of the
certificate sued upon, and interest from June 13, 1950,
at the rate of eight per cent per annum (R. 47). Defendant appeals from this judgment.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point No. 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF, SAID JUDGMENT BEING
CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.

Point No. 2.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT NO. 4, AND FINDING OF FACT
NO. 5, TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT ILLEGALLY
DEMANDED A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION OR EVIDENCE
OF INSURABILITY AS A PREREQUISITE TO REINSTATEMENT OF THE POLICY AFTER LAPSE DUE TO NONPAYMENT OF PREMUMS WITHIN GRAGE PERIOD, AND
THAT SAID REQUIREMENTS WERE WAIVED, SAID FINDINGS BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.

Point No. 3.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT NO. 6, TO THE EFFECT THAT
THE PHYSICAL CONDITION AND PRIOR HOSPITALIZASponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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TION OF INSURED WAS NOT MATERIAL AT THE TIME
OF ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY SUED UPON, SAID FINDING BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.

Point No.4.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT NO. 6, WHEREIN IT FOUND
THAT THE POLICY BECAME INCONTESTABLE BY ITS
TERMS AFTER TWO YEARS, SAID FINDING BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.

ARGUMENT
Point No.1
Appellant's Point No. 1 is that the trial court erred
in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff, and that the
judgment is contrary to the law and evidence.
While certain of the questions to be resolved turn
largely on the interpretation of the insurance certificate
and the application, it is difficult to conceive how the
judgment of the trial court can be sustained. The policy
was issued by a mutual benefit association, in consideration of the payment of a membership fee, the signed
application, which was attached thereto and made a part
thereof, and the payment of premiums (Exhibit "A").
The policy further provides that "this policy and the
application therefor shall constitute the entire contract
between the parties hereto."
It is appellant's first contention that the policy never
came into effect because of the breach of warranties by
assured upon which the validity of the contract itself
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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depended. The policy provides that as a condition precedent to the policy ron1ing into existence that assured
must be in good and vigorous health, and that all answers
in the application are to be construed as warranties and
not misrepresentations, and further, any such warranties
if proven untrue, shall void the policy and relieve the
company from all liability thereunder (Exhibit "A").
That insured's ailments and seriously impaired
health enhanced the risk of death, and were material
to the risk at the time of application, is not disputed. The
uncontradicted evidence is that at the time of the application, and prior thereto, Dr. Gregerson was suffering
from cardiac failure, other serious heart conditions and
hypertension, as well as other less serious physical impairments, and had, in fact, been hospitalized for treatment of the same from April 26 to May 11, 1946 (R. 39,
40, 46, Exhibits 6, 7).
Apparently the trial court applied the prov1s1ons
of Insurance Code requiring a stipulation in all policies
issued by Life Insurance Companies to the effect that
all statements made by insured shall, in the absence
of fraud, be deemed representations, and not warranties,
in construing the policy herein. Subsection 4, of 43-22-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended by Chapter 63,
Laws of Utah, 1947, provides as follows:
" (4) A provision that the policy shall constitute the entire contract between the parties, and
that all statements made by the insured shall, in
the absence of fraud, be deemed representations
and not warranties, and that no such statement
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or statements shall be used in defense of a claim
under the policy, unless contained in a written
application therefor and a copy of such application shall be indorsed upon or attached to the
policy when issued."
The policy sued upon was issued by a mutual benefit
association, namely the Mountain States Insurance Company, which operated on the assessment plan. The following provision appears in the policy with reference
to assessments, at page two, Exhibit "A":
"In addition to the regular premiums designated on the first page hereof, such additional
premiums or assessments to the extent needed to
pay a proportionate share of claims and expenses
necessary to maintain the tabular reserves required under this Policy and the laws of this
State, shall be paid as required by Section 31,
Chapter 44, Laws of Utah, and any amendments
hereafter made."
Section 43-22-1 of the Insurance Code, supra, specifically excepts the application of its provisions to companies operating on the assessment plan. At the end
of the statute itself appears the following:

"Exceptions: The foregoing provisions shall
not apply to annuities, industrial policies, or to
group life insurance, or to companies operating
on the assessment plan."
It is submitted that the trial court erred in applying
the theory of representations rather than warranties. The
evidence, however, is abundantly clear that even on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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theory of fr~udulent 1nisrepresentations the insurance
contract should haYe been declared void. In the case of
Gillan 'V. Equitable Life ~:1ssurance Society, (Nebr.), 10
N\v. . (~d) 693, 1-1-S .A.LR 496, a statute 1nuch the same
as 43-:2:2-1 (4), lT tah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended,
supra,

"~as

under consideration. The Supreme Court of

Nebraska held the policy void, under a similar fact situation to the case at hand, using the following language,
as appears at page 503 of

'T olmne 148 of A.L.R.:

"Within the meaning of these definitions the
conclusion is inescapable that the answers given
by plaintiff were fraudulent. It is well known that
the issuance of policies with or without disability
benefits is dependent upon the health of the applicant, and a wilful and intentional failure of an
applicant to disclose in response to direct and
clear inquiry that which the company had the
right to know for the purpose of determining the
true state of health of the applicant, and whether
or not it would accept the risk, cannot be considered other than fraudulent."
Insured was a dentist, whose formal education included a considerable amount of medical training. There
can be no doubt but that insured, at the time of the application, well kne'v and understood the gravity of his ailments.
It is submitted that by the clear and convincing evidence of fraud on the part of the applicant, Dr. Gregerson, the insurance policy should be declared void.
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While there was a conflict of evidence as to insured's condition of health in the case of Braddock, by
Smith, v. Pacific Woodmen Life Assn., 89 Utah 75, 54
P. (2d) 1189, that case is very similar to, and decisive
of this case insofar as the warranties of insured are concerned. There, the applicant for a certificate in a fraternal benefit association, answered questions much the
same in substance as those contained in insured's application (Exhibit "A"). The trial court submitted the case
to a jury on the theory that the statements made by insured were representations rather than warranties. This
court remanded the case for a retrial to allow the parties
to present their evidence under the correct theory of
warranty rather than misrepresentation. This court
indicated that if there had been no conflict of evidence
as to whether applicant was in fact in good health at the
time, it would have directed a dismissal of the cause in
the lower court. In the present case, the evidence is clear
and uncontradicted that the applicant, at the time of
answering the warranties contained in the application
on May 23, 1947, was afflicted with serious illness and
diseases (R. 39, 40, 46, Exhibit 6), which were of such a
nature as to weaken and impair the constitution, shorten
life, and directly affect the insurance risk.
In the Braddock v. Pacific Woodmen Life Assn. case,
supra, this court, at page 81 of Volume 89 of the Utah
Reports follows the general rule that a breach of warranty, such as is present here, renders the policy void.
The Court stated :
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" ..:\. different and Inore strict rule of law applies to breach of '"·arran ty than to false representations. ·A U'arra nty in the la1r of insurance
consists of a stateJnent by insnred ~tpon the literal
truth of zchich the validity of the contract depends.' 3:2 C. J. 1:273. The distinctions between
warranties and representations are stated as follo"~s in 32 C. J. 1275:

' * * * a warranty must as a rule be
strictly true or fulfilled, while it is sufficient
that a representation be substantially true;
that the materiality in fact of matter made
the subject of a warranty is not, unless the
rule is altered by statute, important, while a
representation, the falsity of which will
avoid the policy, must, at least in the absence
of bad faith, have been as to a material matter. Again, the good faith of insured is immaterial in the case of a warranty, while it is
important in the case of a representation.
Further, it has been pointed out that a misrepresentation renders a policy void upon
the ground of fraud, while the falsity or nonfulfillment of a warranty operates as a
breach of the contract.' "
There can be no doubt the statements were warranties, and that facts relied upon by the insurer were
falsely made, and material to the risk. Under the Braddock case, supra, the policy is void irrespective of
whether insured knew of his condition.
Indeed, in the application in the case at hand, there
were much more pointed questions asked than in the
Braddock case, supra. The application required Dr.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Gregerson to answer if he had ever had any heart or
circulatory diseases, or if he had ever been under observation, care or treatment in a hospital. These questions were answered in the negative by applicant, although just one year prior to th~ signing of the application for the policy sued upon, he was admitted to the
L. D. S. Hospital in Salt Lake City, where he remained
for fourteen days for treatment (R. 39, 40, Exhibit 6).
While in the hospital, applicant was under the care of
Dr. Stobbe, whose diagnosis was cardiac failure, probably coronary, hypertension and cardiac asthma (Exhibit
?) . Digitalis constituted part of the treatment, and upon
advice of his physician, applicant took digitalis for three
months (Exhibit 7). A further question requiring an
answer in the application was : "Are you now in good
health~" In the Braddock case, supra, at page 87 of
Volume 89 of the Utah Reports, in construing an identical provision, the Court stated :

"As already indicated, the question for determination is not whether the applicant knew he
was or was not in good health, or whether he answered in good faith. The warranty is that he is
in fact in good health at the time. The meaning
of the term 'good health' is well stated in Klein
v. Farmers' & Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 132 Kan.
748, 297 p. 730, 732 :
'What is good health as used in the insurance contract like the one in question~ It
is not apparent good health, nor yet a belief
of the applicant that he is in good health, but
it is that he is in actual good health. Of
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course, slight troubles or temporary indisposition which 'vill not usually result in serious
consequences, and 'vhich do not seriously
impair or 'veaken his constitution, do not establish the absence of good health, but, if the
illness is of a serious nature, such as to
'veaken and impair the constitution and
shorten life, the applicant cannot be held to
be in good health. l\Iiller v. ICnights and
Ladies of Security, 103 Kan. 579, 175 P. 397;
Pickens v. Security Benefit Ass'n., 117 Kan.
475, 231 P. 1016, 40 A. L. R. 654. In a note
in 40 A. L. R. 663, it is said: 'The general
rule appears to be that the te.rm 'good health'
when used in a policy of life insurance means
that the applicant has no grave, important, or
serious disease, and is free from any ailment
that seriously affects the general soundness
or healthfulness of the system. A mere
temporary indisposition which does not tend
to weaken or undermine the constitution, at
the date of the policy, does not render the
policy void. And it seems that an apparent
condition of good health or anyone's belief
that the insured is in good health is not sufficient.' "
In the light of previous opinions of this Court and
the facts of this case, the conclusion is unescapable that
the untrue statements and concealment of facts by applicant as to his state of health rendered the certificate null
and void.
If the policy in question (Exhibit "A") ever became
effective in view of the breach of warranties by applicant,
it was by no stretch of imagination in force at the time
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of Gregerson's death on April 8, 1950. The evidence is
clear as to the failure to pay the premium due on J anuary 1, 1950, and there was no payment tendered whatsoever within the grace period as required by the stipulations of the insurance contract (R. 9). On February 2,
1950, a payment covering the premium due on January
1st was tendered, but the same was held in suspense
by defendant, pending reinstatement, and subsequently
returned to plaintiff (R. 9, 44, Exhibit 3). There was
no further tender of premiums until May 3, approximately one month after the death of Dr. Gregerson,
when the sum of $47.07 was received by defendant purportedly covering the premiums due February 1st, March
1st, and April 1st, 1950. This amount was likewise held
in suspense pending reinstatement, and subsequently returned to plaintiff (R. 10, 31, 32).
The terms of the policy are clear as to the requirements for reinstatement after a lapse. The policy provides, in part, as follows : "This policy may he reinstated
anytime within thirty days and less than six months
after a lapse on payment to the company of arrears of

premium with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum provided that such reinstatement shall require
evidence of insurability satisfactory to the Company, and
subject to reinstatement provisions (Commuted Benefits) (Exhibit "A"). The trial court did not consider that
the failure of Gregerson to pay the premiums due, and
furnish the required proof of insurability, prevented a
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reinstaten1ent of the policy. It "Tas not within the power
of the court to revive the policy after lapse; that power
alone rested with the parties to the contract.
It is well settled that if conditions precedent to a
reinstatement of the policy have not been performed by
the insured, no reinstatement takes place, and his death
during the pendency of the application gives his beneficiary no right of recovery, 29 Am. Jur., page 252 ~ 268.
Plaintiff stated that Gregerson could not sign the application for reinstatement as he was too ill, and there
was no attempt to comply with this requirement stipulated to in the insurance contract as a condition of reinstatement (R. 19, 20). On the contrary, the plaintiff produced a report from Dr. Stobbe stating that insured had
been totally incapacitated for a year, as a result of a
serious heart condition (Exhibit 2). The defendant then
undertook an investigation to determine if insurance
could be properly reinstated in view of insured's seriously impaired health. There is no dispute that at the
time of the lapse due to the non-payment of premiums,
insured was practically on his death-bed.
The general rule as to the necessity of sound health
as a requirement for reinstating a lapsed policy of insurance is stated in 29 Am. Jur., Sec. 269, at page 253, as
follows:
"The second condition usually required to be
complied with in reinstating a life insurance
policy is proof or warranty by the insured as to
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his "good" or "sound" health or insurability at the
time of reinstatement of the policy. Where the
insurance contract contains such a condition, payment of the premium alone is not sufficient to
procure a reinstatement, but the insured must
warrant or furnish the required proof of the
state of his health at such time; and under such
a condition, it has been generally held that the
appearance of good health or the reasonable belief that the insured is in good health is not sufficient, but that the insured must in fact be free
from any disease or ailment which tends seriously to affect his health."
This court, in the recent case of Gressler v. New

York Life Insurance Co., 108 Utah 182, 163 P. (2d)
324, 164 ALR 1047, held that a policy was not entirely
terminated upon default of premium payment, but the
insured still had a contractual right under the policy
to fully reinstate it upon compliance with the conditions
for reinstatement contained in the policy. The provision in the policy construed in the Gressler case was much
the same as the provision involved in this appeal. That
provision also required "evidence of insurability satisfactory to the Company" and payment of overdue premiums and interest. That case differs materially, however, in that the insured, after a lapse of premiums, had
actually returned his application for reinstatement and
presented evidence of insurability to the c·ompany, while
in the present case there was no evidence whatsoever of
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ther in the case at bar, there was no tender of premium
payments and interest during the lifetime of insured
which could possibly fnlfill the requirements of the
policy.
Plaintiff contends, and the Court found, that by
the 'Yaiver attached to Exhibit "A", the company waived
physical examination of the insured as to his insurability
at the time of application, and also at the time of any
reinstatement (R. 45). Why, then, was the applicant
required to complete an application for the policy before
the same was issued~ It was not a continuation of the
old policy (Exhibit 5), originally issued by the Mutual
Benefit Association. The new contract became effective
June 1, 1947, setting forth new and different duties and
obligations between the parties. While it is basically
the same type mutual benefit assessment certificate, it
contained different provisions entirely foreign to the old
type policy.
We call the Court's attention to the waiver (Exhibit
"A", page 2), relied upon by the plaintiff.
The waiver, attached to the policy, reads as follows:

"* * * WHEREAS, GRANT GREGERSON, the
above insured, has for a period of more than six
months immediately last past been insured under
a policy in the Mountain States Insurance Company; and
"WHEREAS, all of the premiums due on said
policy for a period of six months or more imSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mediately prior to the date hereof have been paid
before the same became delinquent;
"NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the
premises, it is hereby agreed that the penalties
contained in the commuted benefits provisions of
this policy are hereby waived as to the said
GRANT GREGERSON to the extent of the principal amount of the policy heretofore in force
upon the life of the said insured, to-wit: the sum
of $3000.00. * * *"
The commuted benefits provisions read as follows:
"COMMUTED BENEFITS·. (a) If the application for this Policy is accepted and a Policy issued without a satisfactory Medical Examiner's
Report, as a condition precedent to the taking
effect of this Policy, the Insured must be in good
and vigorous health and free from all bodily ail. ments and disease at the date of issue and delivery
of this Policy or at the date of reinstatement after
any lapse thereof. Otherwise, any benefits accruing under this Policy are hereby forfeited and
the Company is relieved of all liability hereunder.
"(b) If the Insured shall die from any cause
except accidental causes within six months following the effective date of this Policy or following
the date of reinstatement after any lapse thereof,
one-half of the benefits otherwise payable hereunder will be paid."
While there may be some ambiguity on the surface,
a careful analysis of the terms of the insurance contract
leaves little doubt as to the meaning of the waiver. The
general rule of construction announced by this Court in
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the case of Fawcett v. Security Ben. Assn., Utah, 104
P. (2d) 21-±, was to the effect that ordinarily the contract should be strictly construed against the society,
and in favor of the insured. At page 218 of Volume 104
P. (2d), ho,Yever, this Court stated this exception to the
above rule:
"Since such provision of the certificate is not
so clear as to be susceptible of but one construction, we must determine which of the permissible
interpretations thereof is consistent with the other
provisions of the entire agreement. Even though
a particular provision of a contract of insurance
be susceptible of more than one meaning, the construction of such provision more favorable to
the assured will not be adopted if other provisions
of the entire contract clearly resolve the ambiguity in favor of the contrary construction."
Looking, then, at the entire agreement (Exhibit
"A"), how can it be said that the company waived evidence of insurability at the time of issuance and any
reinstatement of the

policy~

The application, a part of

the consideration for the issuance of the policy itself,
reads in part as follows:

"* * * and that this application shall be the
basis and become part of the Contract between
myself and the Company; and that any concealments, misrepresentations or untrue statements
herein or if I am not alive and in good health at
the time of the acceptance and delivery of the
policy based hereon or at the time of any reinstatement after a lapse thereof, hereby forfeit any
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benefits under any Policy that may be issued and
hereby authorize the Secretary or President to
cancel this Policy."
The provision as to medical reports (Exhibit "A",
page 2), reads as follows:
"MEDICAL REPOR·T. If a satisfactory Medical
Examiner's report is furnished showing the Insured to be in good health and free from all bodily
ailments and diseases, and this Policy is kept in
full force and effect thereafter, without a lapse,
the face amount of this Policy will be payable
to the Beneficiary upon receipt of d.ue proof of
the death of the Insured. The face amount of the
Policy will also be payable immediately, as herein provided, from death caused through purely
accidental means."
The policy, on page 2 under Premium Payments,
states in clear and unambiguous language :
uif any premium is not paid within the grace period, the liability of the 0 ompany shall cease immediately, except as herein expressly otherwise
provided."
Other general provisions which must be considered
especially in construing the contract are the consideration and reinstatement clauses, which appear on page 2
of Exhibit A, as follows:
"CONSIDERATION. This Policy is issued in
consideration of the membership fee, the signed
application therefor, copy of which is attached
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hereto and made a part hereof and the payment
of the premi~tnts designated in the schedule of
Insurance on the first page hereof and as other'vise provided under additional premiums. This
Policy and the application therefor shall constitute the entire contract between the parties hereto. All anszDers and statements in the application
shall be deemed warranties and not representations. Any snch warranties if proven untrue, shall
void this Policy and relieve the Company from all
liability there~l,nder. This Policy is issued on a
monthly net term basis to the first of the month
following the date of issue, and thereafter on a
preliminary term basis and shall be so valued.
"REINSTATEMENT. If any premium is not
paid as herein provided and this Policy is allowed
to lapse, the acceptance by the Company of a past
due premium within thirty days after lapse without notice to the insured will be considered a reinstatement as provided under "Commuted Benefits." This Policy may be reinstated anytime within thirty days and less than six months after a
lapse on payment to the Company of arrears of
premium with interest at the rate of 5% per
annum provided that such reinstatement shall
require evidence of insurability satisfactory to
the Company and subject to reinstatement provisions (Commuted Benefits). For each reinstatement, the Cash value, the paid-up insurance and
extended term insurance will be reduced and extended in like proportion as the amount of Insurance liability is reduced."
There could be no interpretation placed on the entire
agreement that would warrant the conclusion that the
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tions, either at the time of issuance or otherwise. If there
had been an intent to waive these requirements, no ap ..
plication would have been required of Gregerson as a
condition precedent to the issuance of this policy. The
waiver provides that Gregerson had been insured under
another policy for more than six months immediately
last past, and that all premiums due on said policy had
been paid before the same became delinquent. The waiver
was intended to apply to, and in fact waived only paragraph (b) of Commuted Benefits, which provides that
if insured died within six months from the date of
policy or any reinstatement, only one-half of the benefits otherwise payable would be paid.
Because the company had previously insured Gregerson under a different policy for in excess of six months,
the usual penalties for reduction of benefits if insured
died within six months were waived by the company.
How can it be said that there was a waiver of the conditions precedent to the policy taking effect, when warranties set out by applicant in his application were fraudulently

misrepresented~

There can 'be no waiver or

estoppel invoked against defendant when it was not
aware of the true facts. This Court, in the case of
Ballard v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 82 Utah 1, 21 P. (2d)

847, at page 26 of the Utah Report, quotes with approval
from the case of Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wolff,
95 U. S. 326, 333, 24 L. Ed. 387, as to the basic principles
of law involved herein:
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"Not only should the company have been informed of the forfeiture before it could he held
by its action to have 'vaived it, but it should also
have been informed of the condition of the health
of the insured at the time the premium was tendered, upon the payment of which the waiver is
claimed. The doctrine of waiver, as asserted
against insurance companies to avoid the strict
enforcement of conditions contained in their policies, is only another name for the doctrine of
estoppel. It can only be invoked where the conduct of the companies has been such as to induce
action in reliance upon it, and where it would
operate as a fraud upon the assured if they were
afterwards allowed to disavow their conduct and
enforce the conditions. To a just application of
this doctrine it is essential that the company
sought to be estopped from denying the waiver
claimed should be apprised of all the facts: of
those which create the forfeiture, and of those
which wiU necessarily influence its judgment in
consenting to waive it. The holder of the policy
cannot be permitted to conceal from the company
an important fact, like that of the insured being
in extremis, and then to claim a waiver of the forfeiture created by the act which brought the insured to that condition. To permit such concealment, and yet to give to the action of the company
the same effect as though no concealment were
made, would tend to sanction a fraud on the part
of the policyholder, instead of protecting him
against the commission of one by the company."
The only logical construction that can be placed on
the effect of the waiver is that the company waived the
right to forfeit one-half of the benefits otherwise payable
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if death resulted within six months after the policy became effective. Any other result or conclusion would be
untenable.
While the facts in the Gressler v. New York Life Ins.
Co. case, supra, are distinguishable from the case at bar,
this Court's statement of the rule of construction as to
provisions for reinstatement is clearly in point. Justice
Wolfe's language is particularly interesting in view of
the trial court's finding that the waiver did away with
the necessity of submitting an application for reinstatement, or evidence of insurability, after a lapse of the
policy. We quote from page 194 of the Utah Report:

"* * * We concede that insurance policies
should, in case of ambiguity, be construed in
favor of the insured and against the insurer who
drew the policy because of the known fact that
prospects for insurance do not have the time nor
ordinarily the ability, at least under the pressure
of solicitation, to carefully examine and weigh the
many printed provisions of a policy. They may
too easily labor under the delusion that they are
covered, only for their dependents to find that
some exception in the policy defeats their rights
as beneficiaries. But certainly these reasons do
not apply with the same force to a provision for
reinstatement where the insured is in default and
has. ample time to ascertain his rights after default and the consequences thereof before or after
default. We see no reason for making identical
language or identical import of language mean
one thing in insurance contracts and something
different in other contracts unless the content
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of those other contracts invests the language with
a different meaning or intent. Insurance companies should not be the orphan litigants of the
courts."
Earlier, this Court, in the case of Moss v. Mutual
Benefit Health & Ace. Assn., 89 Utah 1, 56 P. (2d) 1351,
quoted 'vith approval the language of Mr. Justice Sutherland of the United States Supreme c·ourt as to the general rule of construction of the terms of an insurance
policy. .A.t page 4 of '7 olume 89 of the Utah Reports
appears the following quotation:
Hit is true that where the terms of a policy
are of doubtful meaning, that construction most
favorable to the insured will be adopted. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U. S·. 167,
174, 44 S. Ct. 90, 68 L. Ed. 235, 31 A. L. R. 102;
Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U. S.
311, 322, 48 S. Ct. 512, 72 L. Ed. 895. This canon
of construction is both reasonable and just, since
the words of the policy are chosen by the insurance company; but it furnishes no warrant for
avoiding hard consequences by importing into a
contract an ambiguity which otherwise would not
exist, or, under a guise of construction, by forcing from plain words unusual and unnatural
meanings."
In view of the interpretation that must be placed
upon the entire contract, it is submitted that there was
no waiver of the requirements that insured be in good
health, either at the time of issuance or reinstatement
of the policy.
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Assuming, however, for the purpose of argument,
that there had been a waiver of these physical requirements, could it be said that insured performed all of the
conditions precedent to the reinstatement of the policy~
The defendant acted upon the purported application for
reinstatement without delay, and when no evidence of
insurability was forthcoming, cancelled the policy. The
insured was in default under the terms of the policy,
and if it was not his duty to come forward to furnish
evidence of good health, at least he was required to pay
the premiums due, together with interest at the rate of
five per cent as stipulated.
It is well settled that the first condition required to
procure a reinstatement is the payment by the insured
of the amount of his debts to the insurer. See 29 Am. Jur.
253, Section 268. The policy lapsed, and no payments
were made or tendered for the months of February,
March or April, 1950. Nothing was done to fulfill this
requirement during insured's lifetime. Several weeks
after insured's death, the back premiums were tendered
to defendant, and upon the basis of this, the trial court
held there was a reinstatement.
The court had no power to revive the contract, the

conditions precedent to reinstatement were not met, and
insured's death gave his beneficiary no right of recovery.
Under the trial court's theory, even if insured had died
three years or thirty years after the lapse of the policy,
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instead of only three months, recovery could still be had
by the beneficiary upon tender of all back premiums.
Such a result is untenable.
For the reasons indicated, it is submitted that the
judgment of the trial court is contrary to the law and
the evidence.
Point No. 2.
This point is directed to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
findings of fact (R. 45). For the convenience of the
Court, the paragraphs objected to are set out as follows:
"That Grant Gregerson was ill at the time;
and thereafter his wife, the plaintiff, negotiated
with the defendants even to an appearance before
the State Insurance Commissioner ; and during
all of said period the defendant illegally de.manded and continued to demand the passing of
a physical examination by the insured as a prerequisite to re-instatement of the policy. By its
own acts it led the insured to believe that any additional tender of premiums beyond that refused
on February 2, 1950, would likewise be refused
without such physical examination; and there is
no evidence that it would have accepted them.
Grant Gregerson died on April 8, 1950; and on
May 2, 1950, plaintiff tendered $47.07 to the defendant, which was refused. Plaintiff in due time,
after May 3, 1950, made formal proof of loss to
the defendant and demanded payment of said
policy, which payment was on June 13, 1950,
definitely and finally refused.
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"That when this policy (Exhibit A) was issued on June 1, 1947, it by its terms referred to
an old policy, which the Court finds, had been
carried by the insured since October 23, 1940,
with the Mountain States Insurance Company,
for $3000, with all premiums fully paid up to June
1, 1947; and 'in consideration' of such old policy
and the long-time premiums paid thereon, this
new policy (Exhibit A) waived physical examination of the insured as to his insurability at the
time of the issuance of the policy (June 1, 1947)
or any reinstatement thereof, 'to the extent of the
principal amount of the policy heretofore in
force', to wit, $3,000. Since the policy sued on
(Exhibit A) is for $3,000 only, the Court finds
that by its terms it waived physical test of insurability both at the time of its issuance and on
February 2, 1950, when timely application for
reinstatement was made."
The chief considerations which lead appellant to disagree with the above findings have been detailed in the
argwnent under Point 1, and appellant reasserts the
argument set forth in connection with Point 1, insofar
as these findings are concerned. This is particularly
true with reference to paragraph 5- relating to waiver
of physical requirements of good health at time of issuance or reinstatement, and it is submitted without
further argument that this finding is contrary to the
evidence, and cannot be sustained.
The Court found, in paragraph 4, that defendant
illegally demanded a physical examination of insured
as a prerequisite to a reinstatement of the policy, and
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that by its own actions, defendant led the insured to
believe that any additional tender of premiums beyond
that refused on February 2, 1950, would likewise be refused. It is submitted that there can be no estoppel or
waiver invoked against appellant, and that the evidence
is uncontradicted to the effect that evidence of insurability satisfactory to the defendant was required before
the policy could be reinstated.
The first condition imposed by the reinstatement
clause here, was that the insured present evidence of
insurability satisfactory to the company. At page 178
of \ 7 olume 108, Utah Reports, in the Gressler v. New Y ark
Life Insurance Company case, supra, this Court stated:

"* * * 'Insurability' as here used may include,
in addition to the state of insured's health, matters affecting the insurance risk involved such as
would have been taken into account at the time the
policy of insurance was originally issued. See
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Pettid, 40
Ariz. 239, 11 P. 2d 833; Kallman v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society, 248 App. Div. 146, 288 N.Y. S.
1032, affirmed 272 N. Y. 648, 5 N. E. 2d 375. As to
the evidence which will be deemed sufficient to
satisfy the company, the overwhelming weight of
authority is to the effect that the company, under
such a reinstatement clause, cannot be arbitrary
or capricious, but that evidence which should be
satisfactory to a reasonable insurer is all that is
required. Kennedy v. Occidental Life Insurance
Co., supra, and cases cited therein."
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Under the Gressler case, supra, if insured had fully
complied, prior to his death, with every requirement
made by the defendant as a condition of reinstatement,
the death of the applicant from a cause in no way involved in his proof of insurability, could make no difference in the defendant's rights. In the present case,
however, there is no evidence whatsoever that insured
complied with any of the prerequisites for a reinstatement of the policy after its lapse due to non-payment
of premiums. It is therefore submitted that the above
findings are contrary to the evidence, and that the policy
was not in force at the time of insured's death.
Point No. 3.
This point is directed to paragraph 6 of the findings
of fact (R. 46), wherein the Court found that the physical condition and prior hospitalization of insured at the
time of issuance of the policy was immaterial. For the
convenience of the Court, this finding is set out as follows:
"The Court further finds that the application
set forth by defendant's answer in paragraph 4
is part of Exhibit A, the policy itself; that the
insured had been hospitalized at the L. D. S.
Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, from April 27,
1946, to May 11, 1946, with medical reports thereon as detailed in an Exhibit duly admitted, and
later in the Veterans Hospital; but the Court
finds that such had no application to this policy,
which waived all test of insurability up to the
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amount of the old policy, $3,000, furthermore the
policy, by its terms, becruue incontestable after
two years."
Appellant, under Point 1, supra, fully discussed
its contention that the breach of 'varranty on behalf of
insured voided the contract and relieved defendant of
all liability thereunder. The evidence is uncontradicted
that Dr. Gregerson, at the time of his application, was in
ill health, and that his ailments seriously enhanced risk
of death, and were material to the risk at the time of
the application.
It is submitted that the Court erred in finding that
the hospitalization and condition of health of the insured
was immaterial at the time of application for the policy
sued upon, and that the case of Braddock, by Smith,
v. Pacific Woodmen Life Assn., supra, is controlling
and decisive of this case insofar as the warranties are
concerned.
The Court further found that the policy by its terms
. waived all test of insurability at the time of its issuance.
This point has also been fully discussed by appellant
under Point 1, supra. We submit that there is no logical
basis upon which the entire agreement could be interpreted to result in a waiver of the requirement of good
health at the time of issuance, which was a part of the
consideration for the issuance of the policy itself. The
waiver itself referred only to the usual penalties for
reduction of benefits if the insured died within six
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months after the issuance or reinstatement of the policy.
If the Court's interpretation is followed, recovery could
be had of only one-half of the amount of the policy, under
any circumstances, as the waiver could not be construed
to apply to both sections (a) and (b) of paragraph
relating to commuted benefits (Exhibit A, page 2).
It is submitted that said finding was in error, and
contrary to the evidence.
Point No. 4.
Appellant's last point is directed to that portion of
paragraph 6 of the findings of fact, which found that
the policy, by its terms, became incontestable after two
years. The provision relating to incontestability is set
out below for the convenience of the Court:
"INCONTESTABILITY. This policy shall
be incontestable after it has been in continuous
force and effect, during the lifetime of the Insured, for a period of two years from the first
of the month following the date of issue or any
reinstatement thereof, except for non-payment
of premiums, fraud, misstatement of facts or
age."
It will be noted that the provisions of the above
section expressly except incontestability for the nonpayment of premiums, fraud, misstatement of facts or
age. The law is too well established to cite cases as to the
interpretation of such a clause. It is submitted that the
finding is clearly contrary to the evidence, in view of the
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admitted non-payment of premiums and the uncontradicted evidence of fraudulent concealment of facts by
insured.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted that the judgment of
the trial court was in error, and that the judgment should
be reversed and an appropriate order entered dismissing
the action, and that appellant should be awarded its costs
on this appeal
Respectfully

su~mitted,

SKEEN, THURMAN and WORSLEY,
and VERL c. RITCHIE,

Attorneys for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

